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CVE-2026-90059

INDEX BUILT · 2026-10-18

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net: stmmac: restore NET_IP_ALIGN in the RX DMA offset

CVE-2026-900593 of 4 sources documented this
19

rank 19 = 0 + 19 + 0 + 0 + 0

rank@v1 · backlog

Someone is already using it

CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS

EPSS 0.00609  ·  without this subject the record ranks 19

What it costs you if it fires

NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own

CVSS 7.5, from the CNA  ·  without this subject the record ranks 0

It is getting worse, not staying still

FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed

no persisting rise in 365 days  ·  without this subject the record ranks 19

How much of the world it touches

NVD CPE configurations

0 products in the CPE ranges  ·  without this subject the record ranks 19

Someone else already set the date

CISA KEV remediation due date

no CISA due date  ·  without this subject the record ranks 19

Hindsight · the state

0.00609EPSSNOT IN KEVas of 2026-10-18
Severity7.5 HIGHreceipt
Harmunauthenticated · networkreceipt
Exploitationnone in held sources
Defensefix not stated as a versionreceipt
Movementdoubled within 72hreceipt
RISING10Risen from 0.00198 to 0.00609 across 3 observations. arc-rules@v1

Foresight · where to check next

No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.

Color is a claim, not decoration:the hostile worldthe defenseno signal

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Reachnetwork-reachable · no privileges required · no user interaction · low attack complexityreceipt
ImpactComplete availability lossreceipt
Scored fromCVSS v3.1 · the CNA's vectorreceipt
Weakness classNo CWE mapping in held sources.

CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA

The fix, and how long it's been waiting.

Fixed inThe CVE record names a fix, but not as a version that can be installed. What it holds is a source commit, a placeholder, or a version the record itself lists as affected.receipt
Patch available sinceNo dated patch-availability record in held sources. The index holds reference URLs without dates and only the current revision of the CVE record, so the day a fix first existed cannot be derived. Only the versions it landed in.
BOD 26-04 deadlineIf the system is reachable from the internet: 14 days. If not: fix at the next system upgrade.derived
Show full BOD 26-04 deadline

CISA has not scored it, so the directive's own defaults apply: automatable no, technical impact total. Calendar days from the KEV listing or from when you find it on a system, whichever is first. Federal agencies are bound from 7 Dec 2026, and contracts often carry it to suppliers. The directive and its table

Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score

Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.

  • RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
  • RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
  • RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
  • RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known

Authority who says so

CVSS, the CNA7.5 HIGHreceipt
Exploit probability0.00609 · top 52% of all CVEsreceipt
Assigned byLinuxreceipt
Recorded changes3 · last 18 Oct 2026derived

Affected & Fixed Versions as published

Affected productLinuxreceipt

A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.

Unaudited dollar value2 of 3 inputs carry a receipt
Exposure$18,600over the next 30 days, if this record is yours
Movementno material movementthe record holds only daily drift and scoring model releases
Basisassumeda published average, not your estate

$18,600 = $4.99M incident cost x 0.6121449559255632 exposure x 0.00609 likelihood

udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run

$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.

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What it is stated by the CNA

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: restore NET_IP_ALIGN in the RX DMA offset Since the RX path was converted to zero-copy, the page pool page is handed to the stack directly as the skb head, and the offset the DMA engine writes at is what determines the alignment of the packet headers. Before the conversion the payload was copied into an skb obtained from napi_alloc_skb(), which reserves NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN. receipt

Read the rest of the CNA's description

The conversion moved the headroom into stmmac_rx_offset() but did not carry over NET_IP_ALIGN, so on architectures where NET_IP_ALIGN is 2 the IP header now lands misaligned: 64 (NET_SKB_PAD) + 14 (ethernet) + 20 (IP) = 98 Same for the XDP branch: 256 (XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM) + 14 (ethernet) + 20 (IP) = 290 On ARM32 this is fatal, because ldm and ldrd trap on unaligned addresses even when CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS is set. Any received echo request panics the machine, e.g: Unhandled fault: alignment exception (0x001) at 0x81873062 Internal error: : 1 [#1] SMP ARM Hardware name: Altera SOCFPGA Arria10 PC is at icmp_echo+0x38/0xa8 LR is at icmp_rcv+0x22c/0x370 Call trace: icmp_echo from icmp_rcv+0x22c/0x370 icmp_rcv from ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2c/0x224 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu from ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0x1a0 ip_local_deliver from ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3c/0x50 ip_sublist_rcv_finish from ip_list_rcv_finish+0x110/0x118 ip_list_rcv_finish from ip_list_rcv+0xc8/0xdc ip_list_rcv from __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x170/0x1c0 ... napi_complete_done from stmmac_napi_poll_rx+0xcb0/0x1030 Code: e24dd068 e59020a0 e28dc010 e0822001 (e8920003) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The faulting instruction is the ldm of *icmp_hdr(skb) in icmp_echo(). Fix by adding NET_IP_ALIGN back to the RX offset, which restores the alignment the stack used to get. Note that commit a955318fe67e ("stmmac: align RX buffers") made a similar change in 2021 and was reverted by commit 12d125b4574b ("stmmac: Revert "stmmac: align RX buffers"") because it caused packet corruption. That patch raised the offset from 0 without adjusting the buffer size accounting, so the DMA engine could arguably write past the end of the RX buffers, though this was never root caused. Commit df542f669307 ("net: stmmac: Switch to zero-copy in non-XDP RX path") since derives the page pool allocation from stmmac_rx_offset(), so the extra bytes are accounted for.

check it yourself git.kernel.org git.kernel.org git.kernel.org receipt

Movement the material steps

18 Sep 20260.00198
28 Sep 20260.00609

This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.

Show all 3 observations
18 Sep 20260.00198
19 Sep 20260.00583
28 Sep 20260.00609

3 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt

The full biography

EPSS 0.00609Published2026-09-17Index as of2026-09-28

Exploit probability more than doubled between 2026-09-18 and 2026-09-19 (0.00198 → 0.00583) and the record had been public for 11 days when this index was last written.

Published 2026-09-17 receipt · Index as of 2026-09-28 derived

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